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“I hold that in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution the Union of these States is 
perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national 
governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic 
law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our National 
Constitution, and the Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it except by some 
action not provided for in the instrument itself.” 
-Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861 
 
“[I]f they will break us up – in God’s name, let the Union go. I love the Union as I love my wife. 
But if my wife should ask and insist upon a separation, she should have it, though it broke my 
heart.” 
-John Quincy Adams, 1801 
  
 “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for 
which it stands, one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” The Pledge 
of Allegiance to the United States flag perfectly captures several of the values Americans hold 
most dear: liberty, equality in the eyes of the law, and national unity. American history 
demonstrates, however, that national unity was not always such a universal value. The possibility 
of disunion and the question of secession have surfaced several times in the history of the United 
States (for example, during the War of 1812, the Nullification Controversy of 1832, and the Civil 
War). These threats of disunion relied on a certain understanding of the American Union in 
which secession is a permissible way for states to resolve constitutional wrongs, an idea that 
seems foreign to most Americans today. Since the act of secession is incompatible with the idea 
of an indissoluble Union, it is necessary to turn to the founding documents and debates for more 
insight into these two interpretations of the American Union.  
A careful study of the founding period reveals two dominant and competing 
understandings of the structure of the new nation: one espousing a compact theory of the Union 
and another advocating for a nationalist theory. The compact theory maintains that each state is a 
sovereign, political body. These separate, sovereign states convened to form the central 
2 
government of the United States, delegating some of their sovereignty to the central government 
for their own safety and the common good. Because the central government is a creature of the 
states, they may challenge, limit, and/or rescind the state sovereignty that was transferred to the 
central government in the original contract. Nationalist theory, on the other hand, insists that the 
states are not sovereign entities. Rather, nationalists contend that, after our separation from Great 
Britain, the people of the United States came together as a whole and formed the central 
government, which then created the several states. In other words, the Union created the states, 
not vice versa, as the compact theory claims. Thus, under the nationalist understanding, the states 




Both of these theories regarding the nature of the Union had their supporters at the 
founding period. However, after President Abraham Lincoln’s strong nationalist rhetoric and the 
bloody war that enforced this nationalist vision, the compact theory virtually disappeared from 
mainstream American political thought. Still, if, as several scholars still contend, the compact 
theory of the Union had many important supporters at the time of the American founding, should 
a constitutional disagreement with such a pedigree be resolved in bloodshed? Pulitzer Prize 
winning historian Jack Rakove may have gotten it correct when he stated: “[t]o reduce or equate 
the validity of secession with the course of war would convert a basic problem of constitutional 
governance into a matter of military fate.”
2
 In the pages that follow, I search the records of the 
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founding period for evidence of the compact theory of the Union and its remedy of last resort, 
secession. 
Methodology 
My objective is to find and assess evidence from the founding period that lends support 
to the compact theory of the Union and secession. To be clear, the question at hand is not 
whether secession is prudent. My concern is not whether secession should be encouraged today 
or at any time in American history. Nor is my objective to establish a definitive understanding of 
the Constitution and the American Union. Rather, I only seek to investigate one interpretation of 
the Union that has been largely disregarded in recent history. In my attempt to evaluate this 
particular understanding of the American Union, I have consulted the core primary texts from the 
period, including The Federalist Papers, the records from the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, and the subsequent state ratifying conventions. I have also consulted the papers and 
speeches of many of the Founding Fathers, including Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 
Additionally, I have consulted the works of notable experts in the study of the founding period 
who have taken up the topics related to my research, including Allen Buchanan, Donald 
Livingston, and Kenneth Stampp. My goal is to provide a better understanding of the compact 
nature of the American Union and shed new scholarly light on the resurgent discussion of 
secession and “states’ rights” in America today. 
 
Definition of Terms and Concepts 
 As with any research question, it is necessary to define the terms and concepts related to 
this query. Before evaluating the compact theory of the American Union and the question of 
secession, I will define the term “secession,” as well as describe the nationalist and compact 
4 
theories of our Union in more detail. Then, I will examine the intersection between the act of 
secession and the compact theory of the American Union.    
 
What is Secession? 
Let me begin with the proper definition and origins of the term “secession.” According to 
political scientist H. Lee Cheek, “the verb ‘to secede’ is derived from the Latin secedere 
meaning ‘to withdraw’ and referring to any act of withdrawal.”
3
 Donald Livingston of Emory 
University explains that before the term “secession” was strictly associated with political theory, 
“one could speak of the soul seceding from the body; or of seceding from one room of a building 
to another; or of seceding from any sort of human fellowship.” This is how ‘secession’ was 
defined in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary in the mid-eighteenth century, Livingston says.
4
 The 
division of the Church of Scotland in 1733 helped incorporate the idea of secession into the body 
of political theory. People who left the Church of Scotland were known as “seceders,” and their 
new Church was called the “Secession Church.” As Livingston states, “[t]he seceding self-
governing religious community paved the way for the seceding self-governing political 
community and the term as we understand it today.”
5
 In contemporary usage the word 
“secession” almost exclusively refers to a political act. Our understanding of the term 
“presupposes the background of the modern state, and this sort of state is only about two 
centuries old. So secession is not just any kind of political action; it is the withdrawal of a people 
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from a modern state under the moral principle of the right of self-government, and such that the 
separation requires the territorial dismemberment of that state.”
6
 
Historically, political philosophy remains largely silent on the issue of secession. Duke 
University professor Allen Buchanan, one of the leading experts in secession, observes: “Neither 
Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, nor Mill devoted any serious attention to 
secession.”
7
 There are plenty of discussions regarding other forms of political resistance, such as 
revolution and civil disobedience, but little to no attention is paid to secession. In his landmark 
work Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, 
Buchanan seeks to fill this gap in political philosophy. He begins by introducing secession as a 
form of political resistance and comparing secession to other types of resistance, namely, 
revolution and civil disobedience. Buchanan explains:  
Unlike the revolutionary, the secessionist’s primary goal is not to overthrow the 
existing government, nor to make fundamental constitutional, economic, or 
sociopolitical changes within the existing state. Instead, she wishes to restrict the 
jurisdiction of the state in question so as not to include her own group and the 
territory it occupies. The salient distinction between secession and revolution is 
that successful secession, being aimed only at restricting the scope of the state’s 
power, not dissolving it, does not, like revolution, require (though it may in fact 
result in) the overthrow of the government.
8
   
 
Thus, secessionists intend to leave the existing government as is and only wish to limit its 
authority over their territory. Like secessionists, civil disobedients do not intend to overthrow the 
existing government and largely recognize its authority as legitimate. As Buchanan points out, 
“through deliberately and openly violating some law or laws, he [the civil disobedient] opposes 
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certain policies or activities of the government, and he does so on ground of political morality.”
9
 
Buchanan also notes that these actions of civil disobedience can sometimes lead to secession, as 
in the case of Gandhi’s civil disobedience aimed at India’s secession from the British Empire.
10
 
 In the American context, the principle of secession assumes a certain understanding of 
our Union where the states have the authority to challenge, abandon, and/or dissolve the central 
government. Let us turn, then, to the two dominant understandings of the Union and what they 
might mean for questions related to secession. 
 
Nationalist Theory versus Compact Theory: Two Understandings of the American Union 
As I mentioned above, scholars usually divide the American founding debates regarding 
the nature of our Union into two major intellectual camps: nationalist theorists and compact 
theorists. Each theory contains fundamental assumptions about the American Union: 
 
Nationalist Theory Compact Theory 
-States are not sovereign political bodies. -States are sovereign political bodies 
-The national government created the states as its 
agents. 
-States created the national government 
through a compact with one another. 
-States do not have the authority to challenge or 
dissolve the authority of the national government. 
-States may challenge or dissolve the 
authority of the national government. 
 
As shown in the above table, one of the main differences between the two theories is the 
question of the locus of sovereignty. While the compact theory acknowledges that the states are 
independent, sovereign entities, the nationalist theory asserts that the states are mere agents of 
the federal government, liaisons, if you will, between the central government and the people. 
                                                          
9




According to the compact theory, the states possess absolute sovereignty, may question the 
powers of the national government and, if need be, recall the sovereignty they delegated to the 
national government. On the other hand, the nationalist theory maintains that the states are the 
political creations of the national government and, thus, have no authority to challenge its 
authority or its existence.
11
  
Before further examining the American founding in light of the compact theory, it is 
important to place the terms “compact” and “contract” and their implications in historical 
context.
12
 Traditionally in Anglo-American jurisprudence, “[a] contract is a promise, or set of 
promises, for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in 
some way recognizes as a duty. Synonyms for the term ‘contract’ are ‘agreement’ and 
‘compact.’”
13
 In order to create a contract, at least two parties must assent to fulfill certain 
obligations in an agreement. If one party breaches the terms outlined in the agreement, the other 
party has the right to take legal action against the delinquent party. According to Kentucky 
attorney and documentary film producer Kent Masterson Brown, “[a] ‘breach’ of a contract is 
simply a failure on the part of one or more of the contracting parties, without legal excuse, to 
perform any promise that forms the whole or part of the contract.”
14
 In Anglo-American law 
there are several legal remedies one can pursue for breach of contract. First, the injured party can 
take their case to court and seek monetary restitution for damages incurred from the breach of 
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contract. Second, the aggrieved party can petition the court to force the other party to fulfill their 
contractual obligations, or else find themselves in contempt of court. The last remedy for breach 
of contract is “‘rescission,’ or the annulment of the contract…The aggrieved party can ask the 
court to annul the contract and, at the same time, ask that he be made whole for his own 




If evidence suggests that the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution could be 
viewed as contracts (or compacts) between sovereign states, then these documents could be 
interpreted in the context of Anglo-American contract law. As parties to these contracts, then, 
“the States have the equitable right of rescission in the event of a breach of the agreement.”
16
 
Thus, secession would be justifiable if the Articles and the Constitution can be interpreted as 
contracts. To begin evaluating these claims, I will first turn to principles of government that 
emerged out of the American Revolution. 
 
The American Revolution: America’s First Secession 
At this juncture, it is important to consider Buchanan’s discussion of the terms 
“secession” and “revolution” in the context of the American founding. From the outset of the 
Revolutionary War, the American colonists never had any intention of overthrowing the British 
government on British soil. They were not traditional revolutionaries, at least not according to 
Buchanan’s definition of the term. They did not question the rule of Parliament or the role of the 
King on the soil of the United Kingdom. Their goal was simply to separate from the British 
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Empire and retain the territory in the New World under their own rule. Thus the American 
“Revolution” was not a “revolution” in the traditional sense at all; it was a form of secession.    
A look at the foundational document of the American War for Independence points to 
that war as a type of secession movement: one people breaking their political bonds with another 
and declaring their independence and the causes "which impel them to the separation." 
When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the 
political bonds which have connected them to another, and to assume, among the powers 
of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s 
God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should 
declare the causes which impel them to the separation. 
 
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these rights are 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that 
whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the 
people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on 
such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely 
to affect their safety and happiness…[W]hen a long train of abuses and 
usurpations…evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, 
it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future 
security.
17
   
 
The idea of one part of a nation separating from the rest of the nation by a type of secession, 
then, seems present in American political thought from our very beginnings, as evidenced by the 
Declaration of Independence. David Gordon, a senior fellow at the Mises Institute, goes so far as 
to assert that “[t]he right of secession lies at the heart of our country’s legitimacy. Deny it, and 
you must reject the American founding.”
18
 It seems, however, that this understanding of the 
American experience has been lost or disregarded over the course of the last two centuries. Thus, 
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10 
we must return to the documents and writings of the founding period to better understand an 
interpretation of the American Union that has largely been forgotten.   
 
The Articles of Confederation: A Contract between the States? 
 As mentioned, the principle of secession assumes a certain understanding of our Union 
where the states have the authority to challenge, abandon, and/or dissolve the central 
government. In the American context, this understanding of the Union is best illustrated by the 
compact theory. If, then, our founding documents can be situated in the context of the compact 
theory and Anglo-American contract law, secession can be understood as an acceptable remedy 
for a breach of these contracts. If not, then secession would find no such support.  
In order for the Articles of Confederation to be considered in terms of the compact theory 
and Anglo-American contract law, there are three conditions that must be met. First, the states 
must be considered sovereign political bodies. Second, the founders must have recognized the 
Articles of Confederation as a contract. And lastly, the sovereign states must be the parties to this 
contract.  
 
Colonial and State Sovereignty 
The sovereignty of the thirteen original colonies has been the topic of much debate 
throughout American history. But research indicates that the sovereignty of the states (or future 
states) was established even before the colonies’ secession from Great Britain. Historian Nathan 
Coleman chronicles the changes in the political environment of the British crown and the 
American colonies. He asserts that a kind of “imperial federalism” had developed between the 
American colonies and the British crown by the mid-18
th
 century, where both Parliament and the 
11 
colonies exercised sovereignty over certain affairs. Parliament and the King conducted external 
affairs affecting the colonies, such as international relations, while the colonies themselves 
handled internal affairs.
19
 As Coleman points out, “the charters of each colony had allowed the 
individual colonies to enact legislation that was ‘suitable to their circumstances, not repugnant 
to, but as near might be agreeable to the laws of England.’”
20
 This balance of dual sovereignty 
remained unquestioned until Parliament began interfering with the internal affairs of the colonies 
through the Sugar and Stamp Acts of 1764 and 1765. Outraged at Parliament’s unprecedented 
exercise of power over internal colonial affairs, Americans cried “no taxation without 
representation” and defended the political liberty that they had enjoyed under the system of 
imperial federalism. In his 1774 “Novanglus” essays, John Adams addressed the disruption of 
this balance of power between Parliament and the colonies. Throughout these essays Adams 
undermined Parliament’s power over the internal affairs of the colonies, writing:  
We had considered ourselves as connected with Great Britain, but we never 
thought parliament the supreme legislature over us. We never generally supposed 
it to have any authority over us, but from necessity, and that necessity we thought 
confined to the regulation of trade, and to such matters as concerned all the 





This notion of colonial sovereignty only grew stronger as the Americans prepared for their 
secession from Great Britain. Coleman contends that “since colonial Americans had maintained 
that any authority England had over the colonies derived from colonial consent, the severing of 
their political bands from England meant this residual authority returned to the individual 
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 And although the Declaration of Independence does not explicitly refer to the 
colonies as “sovereign,” it nevertheless affirms that “these united colonies are, and of right ought 
to be, free and independent states” and that they reserve all the powers that free and independent 
states enjoy.  
The sovereignty of the future states was further bolstered by their terms of separation 
from Great Britain. Harvard University and University of California, Berkeley professor Raoul 
Berger noted that each sovereign colony separately declared its independence from Great 
Britain.
23
 This was not a national effort. Berger also points out that, after the War for 
Independence had been won, the British Empire recognized the independent sovereignty of each 
state. In the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, Britain 
“acknowledges the said United States, viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island 
and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 




 This principle of sovereignty was further perpetuated in the Articles of Confederation. 
Berger quotes several of our Founding Fathers who suggest that state sovereignty was widely 
accepted at the creation of the Articles.
25
 Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut declared that “in the 
hour of common danger” the 13 states “associated as free and independent states.”
26
 Jonathan 
Dayton of New Jersey confirmed that “[w]e, as distinct societies, entered into the compact (the 
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 And Luther Martin of Maryland asserted that “[a]t the separation 
from the British Empire, the people of America preferred the Establishment of themselves into 
thirteen separate sovereignties instead of incorporating themselves into one.”
28
 Even the Articles 
themselves insisted that “each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and 
every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the 
United States, in Congress assembled.”
29
 And so, the historical context leading up to the eventual 
formation of a confederation among the former colonies, as well as the language of the Articles 
themselves, seem to suggest that the individual colonies/states possessed sovereign power. What, 
then, do the Articles of Confederation say about these questions? 
 
The Articles as Contract? 
 During the War for Independence, the American colonies collectively recognized a need 
for some type of central government. No longer able to rely on Parliament to handle issues of 
foreign diplomacy, the colonies thought it prudent to create a central government that would 
manage the war, as well as international relations. And so John Dickinson of Delaware, a 
delegate to the Continental Congress, was charged with the task of constructing a confederation 
among the colonies and designing the proposed central government. After much debate on the 
structure and powers of this new government, the Continental Congress, composed of delegates 
from all thirteen colonies, agreed to the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union in 
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November of 1777. The Articles created a “firm league of friendship”
30
 between the thirteen 
colonies and established a central government with certain enumerated powers to conduct 
foreign affairs. The document was submitted to the colonies for ratification, with Maryland being 
the last colony to ratify the document in 1781. The Articles remained in operation until 1789 
when the U.S. Constitution was adopted.
31
   
The peculiar design of the Articles of Confederation has prompted many historians to 
question how the document should be understood. Based on the numerous references to the 
Articles as a contract, several scholars contend that the Articles can be understood in terms of 
Anglo-American contract law. In the Articles themselves, the agreement among the states is 
designated as a “confederacy”
32
 and a “confederation.”
33
 According to Samuel Johnson’s 1785 
dictionary, these terms denote “a league; a contract by which several persons or bodies of men 
engage to support each other; union; engagement; federal compact”
34
 (emphasis added). Records 
from the Constitutional Convention further imply that the Articles of Confederation were indeed 
a contract. James Madison specifically refers to the Articles as a “treaty…among the 
governments of independent states,”
35
 as well as a “confederation” and a “confederacy.”
36
  
With regard to the parties in this compact, it is apparent that each colony/state, in its 
sovereign capacity, consented to this contract. Indeed, the preamble to the Articles reads: “the 
delegates of the United States of America…agree to certain articles of confederation and 
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perpetual union between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.”
37
 In reference to the Articles, 
William Paterson of New Jersey, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, stated: “When 
independent societies confederate for mutual defence, they do so in their collective capacity; and 
then each state for those purposes must be considered as one of the contracting parties.”
38
 Thus, 
evidence suggests that the Articles of Confederation can be considered a contract between 
sovereign states for their benefit and protection. This is especially significant to an understanding 
of the origins of American political theory. If the Articles of Confederation can be understood in 
terms of the compact theory and contract law, then a breach of contract would justify the 
annulment of the agreement in the eyes of the law. And eventually, at least according to James 
Madison, that is exactly what happened. 
 
Breach of Contract 
 Although the Articles of Confederation stressed that “the union shall be perpetual,”39 the 
Union under the Articles was nevertheless deemed ineffective and a convention was called to 
improve it. Since the Articles did not provide the means for the dissolution of the established 
government, the members of the Convention spent a great deal of time at the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention discussing the proper way to break up the Union established by the Articles. During 
this lengthy discussion, James Madison asserted that “a breach of any one article, by any one 
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party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention as dissolved.”
40
 
Again, Madison stated that “[a]lthough all the states have assented to the confederation, an 
infraction of any one article by one of the states is a dissolution of the whole. This is the doctrine 
of the civil law on treaties.”
41
 Madison, together with other delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention, argued that, because not all of the states strictly adhered to the Articles of 
Confederation and because the Articles were wholly ineffective, each state was free to sever its 
ties to the established Union. Thus, according to Madison, secession from the Union created by 
the Articles was permissible in the event of a breach of contract.  
If the Articles of Confederation can legitimately be understood as a contract, can the 
same be said for their replacement, the U.S. Constitution? 
 
The U.S. Constitution: A Second Contract between the States? 
After several years of operating under the Articles of Confederation, it became apparent 
to the states that the Articles themselves were quite ineffective. There were several flaws with 
the system of government established under the Articles, including the prevalence of interstate 
trade issues, the absence of a national executive, and the lack of a national army, to name a few. 
After the central government’s failed response to Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts, the states 
were convinced that the Articles needed to be amended. And so, in the summer of 1787, the 
states sent delegates to a convention in Philadelphia to discuss changes to the Articles of 
Confederation. However, it turned out that, instead of just amending the Articles, the delegates 
agreed to replace them altogether with a new document, the United States Constitution. With the 
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formulation of the Constitution, the delegates, in essence, dismantled the existing, “perpetual” 
Union “in order to form a more perfect union”
42
 among the states. 
How, then, should the Constitution be interpreted? Did the founders preserve the 
underlying principles of the Articles of Confederation in this “more perfect union,” or did they 
build the new Union on a wholly new foundation? Are Americans justified in understanding the 
Constitution as a compact between the states, just like the Articles of Confederation? In order for 
this understanding of the Constitution to be considered plausible, the same three conditions of 
the compact theory must be met: the states must be considered sovereign political bodies, the 
founders must have recognized the Constitution as a contract, and the sovereign states must be 
the parties to this contract. 
 
Continued Sovereignty of the States 
 The concept of state sovereignty was thoroughly entrenched in American political 
thought at our nation’s inception. So, naturally, many delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
were worried about the proposed centralization of power in the new Constitution. The founders 
assured the delegates and their constituents that the sovereignty of the states would be well 
guarded. Writing under the pseudonym “Publius,” James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and 
John Jay did their best to allay these fears in their collection of essays called The Federalist 
Papers. Several of these essays offer insight into the concept of state sovereignty. In Federalist 
35 Publius writes: “as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, 
the state governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, 
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and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.”
43
 Again in 
Federalist 39 Publius asserts that “[e]ach state, in ratifying the constitution, is considered as a 
sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act.”
44
 
Furthermore, he assures the states in Federalist 45 that they “will retain, under the proposed 
constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty….”
45
 These statements establish two 
important things. First, Publius concedes that the states were sovereign entities before the 
creation of the Union. He also acknowledges that the central government derives its power from 
the delegated sovereignty of the states. Note that these are two of the fundamental differences 
between the nationalist theory and the compact theory. It appears that Publius, despite his 
reputation as the main voice of centralizing Federalist defenders of the Constitution, offers 
significant evidence here in support of the compact theory of the Union.  
Some states, still wary about the expansion of centralized power, took matters into their 
own hands to protect their sovereignty. Several state ratifying documents (specifically, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island) explicitly declared that 
all powers not “clearly delegated” to the United States government were retained by the states. 
For example, the New York ratification document reads:  
We, the delegates of the people of the state of New York…do declare and make 
known…that every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by the said Constitution 
clearly delegated to the congress of the United States, or the departments thereof, remains 
to the people of the several states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they 
may have granted the same…
46
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The use of the term “delegate” is especially significant. It is the same word used in the 10
th
 
Amendment to the Constitution, which reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.” The word “delegate” implies that the states are giving up some of their own 
sovereign powers and authorizing the central government to use those powers; that is, the central 
government only derives its power from the existing sovereignty of the states.   
 
The Constitution as Contract? 
In 1798 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison penned probably the most famous 
exposition of the compact theory of the 18th century: the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. 
These public documents were written and passed in response to the Adams’ administration’s 
Alien and Sedition Acts. They explicitly reference the Constitution as a “compact” a combined 
total of 16 times. Article I of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 reads: 
Resolved, That the several States composing, the United States of America, are not united 
on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but that, by a 
compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States, and of 
amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purposes — 
delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each State to itself, the 
residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general 
government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no 
force: that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral part, its co-
States forming, as to itself, the other party: that the government created by this compact 
was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; 
since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its 
powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among powers having no common 
20 
judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the 




Likewise, the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 read:  
[T]his Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the 
federal government, as resulting from the compact, to which the states are parties; as 
limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting the compact; as no 
further valid that they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that 
in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by 
the said compact, the states who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, 
to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their 




Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, two of America’s most prominent Founding Fathers, 
agreed that the Constitution was, in fact, a compact. But who were the parties to this compact? 
The language of the Constitution itself offers an answer to this question. Here we also find some 
interesting evidence suggesting that the Constitution was a form of contract between the several 
states with the states maintaining their role as important political entities after its enactment.  
Before a draft of the Constitution was referred to the Constitutional Convention’s 
Committee of Style, the delegates to the convention agreed on the following text for the 
preamble: “We the People of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and 
establish the following Constitution for the Government of ourselves and our posterity.”
49
 Each 
state was named and identified as the unit within which the people’s sovereignty was being 
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expressed. Uncertainty about which states would actually ratify the Constitution, however, 
prompted the Committee of Style to change the preamble to “We the People of the United 
States.”
50
 While many nationalist theorists make much of this terminology, the history of the 
change seems to indicate it was done simply for the practical purpose that any nine states could 
have ratified the document and the Convention could not predict which they might be. Any state 
ratifying the document would be left out of the contract. As described in Article VII of the 
Constitution, the document is a “constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”
51
 
 Publius also addresses this issue in The Federalist Papers. Consistent with the language 
of the Constitution, he contends that the states are parties to this constitutional compact. He 
writes in Federalist 39 that the ratification of the Constitution “is to be given by the people, not 
as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent states 
to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several states, 
derived from the authority in each state…the authority of the people themselves.”
52
 Furthermore, 
he asserts that ratification of the Constitution “must result from the unanimous consent of the 
several states that are parties to it.”
53
  
Additionally, James Madison himself asserts that the states are parties to the Constitution. 
Several delegates at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, like so many others, were concerned 
about the nature of the proposed government in the Constitution. Having just separated from the 
British Empire, they were worried about a strong central government that could quickly 
deteriorate into tyranny. One of the delegates, James Monroe, stressed his reservations 
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concerning the new Constitution: “Upon reviewing this government, I must say, under my 
present impression, I think it a dangerous government, and calculated to secure neither the 
interests nor the rights of our countrymen.”
54
 Another delegate, Patrick Henry, warned the 
convention of the dangers of an overbearing federal government: “Here is a resolution as radical 
as that which separated us from Great Britain. It is radical in this transition; our rights and 
privileges are endangered, and the sovereignty of the states will be relinquished: and cannot we 
plainly see that this is actually the case?”
55
To dispel the fears of Henry, Monroe, and others, 
Madison assured the delegates that the new government “is not completely consolidated, nor is it 
entirely federal.”
56
 He says: “Who are the parties to it [the Constitution]? The people – but not 
the people as composing one great body; but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties.”
57
 
Furthermore, two of the ratifying instruments produced by these state conventions explicitly 
refer to the Constitution as compact between the states. The ratification documents of 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire acknowledge that the states are “entering into an explicit and 




Breach of Contract 
What, then, happens if the terms agreed upon in the Constitution are violated? Recall that 
under Anglo-American contract law, aggrieved parties to the contract have the right to dissolve 
the compact and return to the status which they held before entering into the agreement. Several 
states explicitly asserted this right, insisting that their people had the right to recall the 
                                                          
54
 Elliot, Elliot’s Debates, Vol. 3 222. 
55
 Ibid., Vol. 3 44. 
56




Ibid., Vol. 1 322. 
23 
sovereignty which the state had delegated to the federal government. The Virginia ratification 
document states: “We, the delegates of the people of Virginia…do, in the name and in behalf of 
the people of Virginia, declare and make known, that the powers granted under the Constitution, 
being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the 
same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression.”
59
 Similarly, New York’s ratification 
document reads: “We, the delegates of the people of the State of New York…do declare and 
make known – That all the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever 
it shall become necessary to their happiness.”
60
 Following Virginia and New York’s lead, Rhode 
Island’s ratification document says:  
We the delegates of the people of the Rhode Island and Providence Plantations…do 
declare and make known – That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they 
form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest of their posterity – among which are the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety…That the powers of 







 century statesmen read the history of the founding in similar ways, 
pointing to the Union as a compact that can be dissolved by one or more of the parties to that 
agreement. Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, celebrated for his classic work Democracy in 
America wrote:  
The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the States; and in uniting together 
they have not forfeited their nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condition of 
one and the same people. If one of the States chooses to withdraw from the compact, it 
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would be difficult to disprove its right of doing so, and the Federal Government would 




John Quincy Adams observed in 1839:  
The indissoluble link of union between the people of the several states of this 
confederated nation is, after all, not in the right but in the heart. If the day should ever 
come (may Heaven avert it!) when the affections of the people of these States shall be 
alienated from each other; when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or 
collision of interests shall fester into hatred, the bands of political associations will not 
long hold together parties no longer attracted by the magnetism of conciliated interests 
and kindly sympathies; and far better will it be for the people of the disunited states to 
part in friendship from each other, than to be held together by constraint.  Then will be 
the time for reverting to the precedents which occurred at the formation and adoption of 
the Constitution, to from again a more perfect Union by dissolving that which could no 
longer bind, and to leave the separated parts to be reunited by the law of political 




Likewise, President Jefferson wrote in 1803: “God bless them both [eastern and western states] 
and keep them in the union if it be for their good, but separate them if it be better.”
64
And again in 
1816: “If any state in the Union will declare that it prefers separation…to continuance in 
union…I have no hesitation in saying, ‘let us separate.’”
65
 It appears that secession was a real 
and legitimate concern facing our new nation. Our founders could hope for the perpetuity of the 
Union, but this experiment in self-government was not certain to last forever. 
 
Conclusion 
Many would agree that the question of disunion and secession in the United States was 
settled by the Civil War and, subsequently, in the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. White 
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(1869). In 1869 the Court declared: “The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an 
indestructible Union composed of indestructible States.”
66
 However, secessionist rhetoric did not 
die with the end of the Civil War and this ruling of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the secession 
debate is still alive and well in the United States as evidenced by several secession movements. 
For instance, in November 2012, the state of Texas submitted a secession petition to the White 
House website’s “We the People” forum.
67
 The petition garnered over 125,000 signatures, 
prompting responses in the media and from the White House. And, lest it be assumed that 
secession is simply a southern concern, the state of Vermont has its own active secessionist 
movement. Founded in October 2003, the Second Vermont Republic is “a nonviolent citizens’ 
network and think tank opposed to the tyranny of Wall Street, Corporate America, and the U.S. 
Government, and committed to the return of Vermont to its status as an independent republic and 
more broadly to the dissolution of the Empire.”
68
 One of the leading Vermont secessionists, 
former Duke University economics professor Thomas Naylor, argued that “the U.S. government 
has become too big, too centralized, too powerful, too undemocratic, too militaristic, too 
imperialistic, too materialistic, and too unresponsive to the needs of individual citizens and small 
communities.”
69
 Naylor and other Vermont secessionists asserted that the United States is 
currently unsustainable and should be broken up into smaller regions that would be more 
responsive to citizens. Support for the movement has surged in Vermont and culminated in a 
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statewide secession convention held on October 28, 2005, the first of such conventions since 
North Carolina seceded from the Union in May of 1861.
70
  
Contemporary secession rhetoric like that from the Texas Nationalist Movement and the 
Second Vermont Republic is usually branded radical and ridiculous in mainstream media and 
politics. In response to the Texas secession petition, Mike Campbell, chief historian of the Texas 
State Historical Association, commented: “This is a strange phenomenon…Most of us sort of 
shake our heads.”
71
 However, the evidence presented here raises enough questions about the 
nature of the American Union to shed new light on the legitimacy of secession. The evidence 
suggests that secession was a foundational principle from our country’s very beginnings. Indeed, 
this nation was founded by the very act of sovereign states seceding from Great Britain. The 
Declaration of Independence itself can be viewed as a kind of secession petition that asserts a 
people’s right to withdraw their consent to be governed, as well as their right “to institute new 
government” or “to throw off” government. As our founders shaped and molded our own 
fledgling Union, they incorporated the ideas of sovereignty and the contractual nature of 
government into our own political system. The sovereignty of the thirteen states and the 
consensual, contractual nature of the American Union can be seen in both the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution, as evidenced by their language and the debates surrounding 
their ratification. The Articles of Confederation forged a “league of friendship” and a 
“confederacy” between the thirteen states, which retained their “sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence.” Likewise, the Constitution formed “a more perfect union…between the states so 
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ratifying the same.” And although they hoped for a perpetual Union, many of our founders, 
including Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, accepted that secession was a legitimate and a 
very real possibility. John Quincy Adams famously said: “[I]f they will break us up – in God’s 
name, let the Union go. I love the Union as I love my wife. But if my wife should ask and insist 
upon a separation, she should have it, though it broke my heart.”
72
 Even Abraham Lincoln, the 
man who would become the greatest champion of the nationalist vision, professed the legitimacy 
of the dissolution of government at one point in his political career: 
Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and 
shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a 
most valuable, a most sacred right – a right which we hope and believe is to liberate the 
world. Nor is this right confined to cases in which the whole people of an existing 
government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people, that can, may 




Over the last two centuries, this understanding of the Union has become clouded with 
partisanship and covered with the dark history of America’s most bloody and destructive war. 
Secession has become a “dirty word,” inextricably linked “to the South, slavery and racism.…”
74
 
As Jack Rakove has argued, however, no constitutional principle should be decided at the end of 
a bayonet. Despite their tattered reputation today, evidence from the founding period 
demonstrates that both the compact theory, and its remedy of last resort, secession, can find more 
legitimacy than we commonly assume in the founding vision of America. 
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